1997 MEETING NOTICES
Pennsylvania, November 22-24, 1997. A current program, including poster
abstracts is in the center of this newsletter. If you have not registered yet
for the meeting, please do so now using the form on page 5. At the
same time, you can pay your 1998 dues.
HOTEL INFORMATION
Conference attendees are advised to contact the Wyndam Hotel at (215) 448-2000
and identify yourself as attending the "Psychonomics and Judgment and Decision
Making" conference.
From the Editor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Letter from the President . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
On-Line Services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1997 J/DM Meeting Registration and 1998 Dues. . . 5
Upcoming Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Psychonomic Society Meeting Abstracts . . . . . . 7
1997 J/DM Meeting: Program Schedule . . . . . . . 8
1997 J/DM Meeting: Poster Abstracts . . . . . . . 12
Position Announcements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Calls for Papers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
SUBMISSION DEADLINE FOR THE NEXT J/DM NEWSLETTER: December 12, 1997
EDITOR:
Shawn P. Curley
Department of Info. & Decision Sciences
University of Minnesota
271 19th Avenue S.
Minneapolis, MN 55455
(612) 624-6546
FAX: (612) 626-1316
scurley@csom.umn.edu
DUES, ADDRESSES, & CORRECTIONS:
Colleen F. Moore/JDM
Psychology Department
University of Wisconsin
1202 W. Johnson St.
Madison, WI 53706
(608) 263-4868
cfmoore@facstaff.wisc.edu
The J/DM Newsletter welcomes submissions from individuals and groups. However, we do not publish substantive papers. Book reviews will be published. If you are interested in reviewing books and related materials, please write to the editor.
There are few ground rules for submissions. The best way to send your contribution is via EMAIL or in an ASCII file on a 3.5" or 5.25" diskette. If you must send hard-copy (e.g., if you are using special graphics or do not have computer access), please submit camera-ready copy. This means that the copy should be typed single-spaced on white 8 1/2 by 11 paper. If possible, use a carbon or film ribbon. Please mail flat -- do not fold.
Advertising Rates: Advertising can be submitted to the editor. Inclusion of the ad and the space given to the ad is at the editor's discretion. The current charge is $100 per page to cover production and mailing costs. Contact Shawn Curley for details. Alternatively, you can use--
Mailing Labels: Some readers may wish to send reprint lists or other material to people listed in the directory. The current charge is $125 for a set of labels. Contact Colleen Moore for details. A diskette of the database is available for one-time use. The charge is $50 for commercial use, $25 for nonprofit use
Address corrections: Please check your mailing label carefully. Because the J/DM Newsletter is usually sent by bulk mail, copies with incorrect addresses or which are otherwise undeliverable are neither forwarded nor returned. Therefore, we have no way of knowing if copies are delivered. Address changes or corrections should be sent to Colleen Moore.
Subscriptions: Subscriptions are available on a calendar year basis only. Requests for information concerning membership in the Society for Judgment and Decision Making should be sent to Colleen Moore.
Hal Arkes
As you may remember, during the summer I asked the J/DM membership to respond to a quick survey to help us understand why a 50%-60% drop had occurred in the number of proposals submitted to the Decision, Risk, and Management Science Program at the National Science Foundation. As many of you know, this program funds a substantial amount of J/DM research. I received responses from 58 people, although not every respondent answered every question. The first four questions could be answered either "Yes" or "No."
Yes No
1. Are you aware of the fact that DRMS funds J/DM research? 50 8
2. Have you ever submitted a proposal to DRMS? 41 9
2a. (Among those who ever submitted)
Have you submitted a proposal in the last year? 19 17
3. Have you ever been funded by DRMS? 29 12
4. What do you estimate the DRMS funding rate to be?
Range # Responses
.01-.10 9
.11-.20 18
.21-.30 10
>.30 4
(The actual answer is .20-.25).
5. If you haven't submitted a DRMS proposal in the last two years but you had
submitted previously, why have you not submitted recently?
Four people mentioned the low probability of success; four mentioned the
fact that they are overworked; two mentioned that they are getting
funding elsewhere; two mentioned that DRMS reviews come from too diverse
a group of reviewers, which leads to inconsistent reviews.
Each of the following reasons was endorsed once:
a. Unfamiliar with process.
b. My research area isn't appropriate for DRMS.
c. I've had no suitable project recently.
d. Too small an amount of dollars is awarded per grant per year.
e. I've put my energy in publishing, not grantsmanship.
f. I've been frightened by threats to social science funding.
g. DRMS has too narrow a focus.
h. DRMS is unreceptive to group research.
i. My work has become more appropriate for other NSF programs.
A few more responses were received, but they were quite idiosyncratic to
the situation of the respondents.
6. Suggestions and comments?
a. Send DRMS proposal deadline reminders to the J/DM membership.
b. DRMS should emphasize applied research.
c. Publicize who is on the DRMS panel.
d. Put in the J/DM newsletter the names of principal
investigators and the title of their successful grant proposals.
e. Increase DRMS budget.
f. Keep funding group research.
g. The DRMS reviews are constructive and friendly.
I calculated the estimated DRMS funding rate for people who answered questions 2, 2a, and 3 "Yes" or "No."
Est. Funding Rate
Yes No
2. Have you ever submitted a proposal to DRMS? 19 19
2a. Have you submitted a proposal in the last year? 16 24
3. Have you ever been funded by DRMS? 16 19
The DRMS program has a web page which contains all of the information concerning successful grants and their principal investigators. The address is:
http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/sber/drms/
The DRMS deadlines are constant from year to year: January 15 and August 15. There are special initiatives and programs which may have different deadlines. Check out the aforementioned web page for that information, too. Program officer Jon Leland tells me that the number of proposals during the current round has risen somewhat, but it is still not back to the levels of a few years ago. In times during which social science funding is under serious scrutiny, it is important that a program has an active constituency rather than a dwindling number of interested investigators.
We welcome suggestions and comments about new features.
Alan Cooke <acooke@sjdm.org>
Alan Schwartz <alansz@sjdm.org>
The Society for Judgment and Decision Making now has its own internet domain name, sjdm.org. On-line services previously offered at mellers1.psych.berkeley.edu should now be accessed from this new domain, as described below.
ELECTRONIC MAILING LISTS
To subscribe, send a message of the form:
subscribe mailing-list YOUR FULL NAME
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where mailing-list is:
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To send a message to all subscribers (including graduate students), send the message to:
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To cancel your subscription, send a message to the same address as for subscriptions of the form:
unsubscribe mailing-list YOUR FULL NAME
REFERENCE ARCHIVE
The system allows users to store and retrieve book and chapter references
related to the fields of judgment and decision making. The archive is located
at:
references@mail.sjdm.org
For more information send the message "help" to this address.
WORLD WIDE WEB SITE
The J/DM Society has a set of pages on the World-Wide Web, providing information
about the Society and Society Membership, upcoming events, all our electronic
services (including course syllabi, easy-to-use forms for subscribing to SJDM
mailing lists, and help with the reference archive), links to related Web sites
that may be of interest to members, copies of the JDM Newsletter (for society
members), and the SJDM directory with links to members' home pages. The URL
(uniform resource locator) for the Web page is:
http://www.sjdm.org
INTERNET SUBJECT COOPERATIVE
This service allows researchers to fill out each other's questionnaires and
surveys, for pilot studies or real data. Contact Jon Baron, the moderator of the
effort at:
baron@cattell.psych.upenn.edu
ONLINE SOCIETY NEWSLETTERS
The SJDM newsletters are available on-line and through email. If you would like
to receive text-only versions of the newsletter via e-mail, subscribe to the
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Send mail to:
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The message should say:
subscribe jdm-newsletter YOUR FULL NAME You must be a member of the society in good standing to subscribe to this mailing list.
This form allows you to: (1) register for the 1997 annual meeting, (2) pay your 1998 dues, and (3) order two decision making journals for 1998 at a member discount rate. You may use the form for any one of these; but, doing all at once saves paperwork and should be more convenient for you.
Name: Phone: ( )
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Meeting registration fee $ 90.00 $45.00 $100.00
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the last year for which you paid) ______ ______
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Note: Registration includes coffee breaks, continental breakfasts (Sunday, Monday), and the Monday lunch. Dues are separate from registration fees. If you want to subscribe to either of the following journals for 1998, just check the appropriate space(s). Do NOT send your journal fees, you will be billed for the amount by the publishers. Please DO send your Society membership dues and meeting registration money.
I wish to subscribe to the following for 1998: [The journal will bill you later for the price of subscription at the special Society rate.]
______ Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
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$85)
Return this form with your check to:
Colleen F. Moore/JDM
Psychology Department
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1202 W. Johnson St.
Madison, WI 53706
*Students must have the endorsement of a faculty member: Faculty signature: __________________________ Date: ________________________ Printed name: _______________________________ Institution: _________________
Society for Computers in Psychology: Philadelphia, PA, November 20, 1997. For information contact: Walter K. Beagley, Dept of Psychology, Alma College, Alma, MI 48801 USA; (517) 463-7267; fax: (517) 463-7277, <beagley@alma.edu>
The Psychonomic Society: Philadelphia, PA, November 21-23, 1997. For information contact: Roger L. Mellgren, Secretary-Treasurer, Dept of Psych, Box 19528, Univ of Texas, Arlington TX 76019-0528 USA, (817) 272-2775, fax: (817) 272-2364, <mellgren@uta.edu>
Judgment/Decision Making Society: Philadelphia, PA, November 22-24, 1997. See this issue of the Newsletter for program and registration information.
Public Choice Society/Economic Science Association meetings: will be at the Hotel Monteleone, New Orleans LA, March 13-15, 1998. For more information contact: Carol M. Robert; Public Choice Society; Center for Study of Public Choice; 1D3 Carow Hall; George Mason University; Fairfax, VA 22030 USA, <www-pubchoso.aas.duke.edu/>.
INFORMS: will be at the Queen Elizabeth and the Bonaventure Hilton Regency, Montr,al, Quebec, Canada, April 26-29, 1998. For information contact: INFORMS Montr,al, 2 Charles Street, Suite 300, Providence, RI 02940 USA; (401) 274-2525; (800) 343-0062; <www.informs.org/Conf/Montreal98>.
American Psychological Society: will be at the Washington Hilton & Towers, Washington DC, May 21-24, 1998. Abstract deadline is: December 15, 1997. For information contact: Program Committee Chair Morton Ann Gernsbacher, University of Wisconsin-Madison, (608) 262-6989, fax; (608) 262-4902, <MAGernsb@facstaff.wisc.edu>, <www.hanover.edu/aps>.
Valencia International Meeting on Bayesian Statistics: Hotel Las Fuentes, Alcossebre, Spain, May 30-June 4, 1998. For information or to be included in the conference mailing list, send to the local organizer, Jose Bernardo [<bernardo@uv.es>, 34.6.386.4362, (fax) 34.6.386.4735] the following information: Name; Affiliation; Postal address; Telephone; Fax; Internet address; Web address; Area(s) of interest within Bayesian Statistics. An information bulletin, including the provisional program and the registration forms, will be sent by September 1997 to those who have indicated interest. Also see <www.uv.es/~bernardo/valenciam.html>.
Economic Science Association: Mannheim University, Mannheim, Germany, June 11-13, 1998. The abstract deadline is February 15, 1998. For information contact: HAPAG LLOYD; Ludwigstr. 30, D-67059 Ludwigshafen; (++49) 621-591-2820; (fax) (++49) 621-591-2821; <www.esa.uni-mannheim.de>.
FUTURE JDM MEETINGS
(assuming continued linkage with the Psychonomic Society meeting)
1998 Dallas, November 21-23
1999 Los Angeles, November 20-22
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING I
Salon F, Saturday Afternoon, 1:30-3:15
Chaired by Carla C. Chandler, Washington State University
1:30-1:50 (524)
Measuring the Future. STEPHEN W. LINK, McMaster University A new wave theory
result shows how paired comparisons provide measures of subjective qualities
like future time, money, or effort. University students judged whether a future
event would occur before other future events, or before specified dates. Paired
comparisons of events versus dates yield a function relating perceived future
time and chronological time. Knowing this function allows future events to be
placed along the chronological time scale. The perceived future manifests
some very surprising and encouraging beliefs.
1:55-2:15 (525)
Context Effects on Ideal Point Preferences. DOUGLAS H. WEDELL, JONATHAN C
PETTIBONE, & STUART M. SENTER, University of South Carolina Ideal point models
assume that preference is determined by similarity to an ideal. Three
experiments tested how manipulation of the contextual set alters ideal points
and preferences. Stimuli were schematic faces varying in width of nose or gap
between eyes. Participants rated pleasantness of faces or chose which face was
most pleasant. Context effects on ideal points led to reversals of preference
ordering in choice and judgment for multidimensional and unidimensional
manipulations.
2:20-2:35 (526)
Combining Judgments: Weighting Our Own Opinions More Than Othrs'. ILAN YANIV &
ELI KLEINBERGER, Hebrew University of Jerusalem In making major decisions (e.g.,
medical treatment, investment) individuals frequently consult the opinion of
other judges. This research examines (1) how people combine their own opinions
with those of other people and (2) their willingness to "purchase" additional
opinions. We found a strong bias such that people overweight their own opinion,
although the bias is sensitive to the quality of the other opinions. Their
purchases are guided by the amount of disagreement.
2:40-2:55 (527)
Judgmental Combination of Forecasts: Effects of Feedback Type. NIGEL HARVEY &
ILAN FISCHER, University College London People are poor at combining different
forecasts for the same event. Whether different types of feedback facilitate
performance has not been systematically studied. On each of 80 trials, we asked
people to combine four forecasts differing in quality. Without feedback they
weighted them equally and judgment performance became noisier over time. With
feedback, individual forecasts were weighted appropriately. Outcome and task
information feedback were more effective than performance feedback. Theoretical
and practical implications are discussed.
3:00-3:10 (528)
Explicit Decisions, Personal Policies, and Self-Control. GRETCHEN B. CHAPMAN,
Rutgers University Seventy undergraduates rated 32 everyday activities (e.g.,
tooth flossing, condom use) as to (1) whether they made explicit decisions about
this activity or behaved automatically, (2) whether they followed a personal
policy, and (3) whether this behavior presented a self-control problem for them.
Having a personal policy was negatively related R = -0.50, N = 32, p < .01) to
making an explicit decision and was associated with fewer self-control problems
R = -0.45, N = 32, p < .01).
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING II
Salon F, Saturday Afternoon, 3:30-5:25
Chaired by William M. Petrusic, Carleton University
3:30-3:50 (555)
Comments on Five New Perspectives on Judgment/Decision Making (JDM). James
Shanteau, Kansas State University In recent years, at least five new conceptual
approaches to JDM research have emerged: (1) rethinking heuristics, (2)
naturalistic decision making, (3) rank/sign dependent utility, (4) expert
decision making, and (5) memory models of JDM. Each suggests a dissatisfaction
with the status quo. The purpose of this presentation is to explore the
background, motivation, similarities, differences, and consequences of these new
perspectives.
3:55-4:15 (556)
Separating Judgment From Response Processes in Statement Verification. THOMAS
S. WALLSTEN, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, RANDALL H. BENDER,
University of Illinois, & YUE-LIN LI,Columbia University We used the stochastic
judgment model to dissociate judgment from response processes. Ability to
discriminate true from false statements varied with knowledge domain but not
with payoff bias. Criteria for saying true had the reverse contingencies.
Error variance due to searching memory exceeded that due to setting
response criteria. Experience decreased both terms, but had no effect on
discrimination ability or on the modest bias to respond true. We discuss
theoretical implications of these results.
4:20-4:35 (557)
Stimulus Structure and Causal Judgments. ALBERT F. SMITH, NADINE M. MEYERS, &
PORTIA T. RIVERA, Cleveland State University In several experiments,
participants rated the degree to which outcome occurrence was predictable from
cue occurrence. Observation conditions were defined by crossing four levels of
P(Outcome 3 Cue) and four levels of P(Outcome 3 No Cue). Cues and outcomes were
always binary, but over experiments, varied between being featural (present vs.
absent) and dimensional (one of two levels was always present). The consistency
of ratings with a normative measure of contingency depended on this structural
characteristic of the stimulus events.
4:40-5:00 (558)
Understanding Valence Framing Effects: The Good, the Bad, and the . . . Risky? SANDRA L. SCHNEIDER & MONICA D. BARNES, University of South Florida The framing typology introduced by Schneider, Levin, and Gaeth demonstrates that valence framing effects involving attributes and goals typically occur in the absence of risk. In this presentation, we will explore the role of risk in the standard paradigm of risky choice framing. We will summarize the literature elucidating when risky choice framing effects occur, and also present results of our recent studies showing how level of risk does and does not influence choice.
5:05-5:20 (559)
Grammatical Choice and Affective Experience in a Second-Language Test. M RTA
BALASK & MICHEL CABANAC, Universit, Laval (read by Michel Cabanac) Subjects
reported their affective experience when reading grammatically correct and
incorrect versions of 50 sentences in their second language (French). Then,
they took a 200-item test offering the correct and incorrect answers to the same
50 sentences. Subjects tended significantly to choose responses, correct as
well as incorrect, corresponding to their highest affective rating that is, to
maximize pleasure. This result supports the hypothesis according to which
decisions are made in the affective dimension of consciousness.
November 22 - 24
Philadelphia Marriott Hotel
1201 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19107
(215) 625-2900
www.marriott.com/marriott/PHLDT
Poster Session #1
(Sunday, November 23, 1:00 - 2:30 pm)
P1-1. James K. DOYLE, Erica DZICZEK, & Kerry DUBRULE (Dept. of Social Science
and Policy Studies, Worcester Polytechnic Institute)
Effect of nature documentaries on judgments of the ecological status of
endangered species.
In his book The Age of Missing Information, Bill McKibben hypothesizes that
watching nature documentaries causes viewers to judge animal species as less
endangered than they really are. This paper describes the results of a
quasi-experimental study designed to test this hypothesis. Visitors at a
science museum were asked to judge the ecological status of six different whale
species either before or after viewing the well-known Omni film "Whales."
People who had seen the film judged two whale species to be significantly less
endangered compared to those who had not yet watched the film. Implications for
environmental communication are discussed.
P1-2. David H. EBENBACH, Colleen F. MOORE, & Jessica GERSHAW (Dept. of
Psychology, Univ. of Wisconsin-Madison)
Assuming the worst: Environmental decisions in the context of missing
information.
Across 2 studies, participants made decisions in environmental dilemmas. In
each study, complete or incomplete information was risks, economic effects,
etc.). Participants also rated the importance of factors, and their assumptions
about incomplete information. Results indicated that participants' assumptions
about missing information strongly affected the way they used available
information, as well as their ultimate decisions. Our findings imply that
people facing difficult environmental problems may base decisions not
only on available facts, but also on important but missing information.
P1-3. Cheryl Brown TRAVIS, Danny S. MOORE (Univ. of Tennessee), & Bruce E. TONN
(Oak Ridge National Laboratory)
Building a tool for environmental decision making.
The Environmental Problem Inventory is a tool devised by researchers at the NSF
National Center for Environmental Decision Making Research to assist in the
first steps of environmental decision making. Dimensions of the inventory
include ecological impact, health effects, economic considerations,
identification of stakeholders, and regulatory issues as well as other factors.
Results of a factor analysis of the Environmental Problem Inventory encompassing
over 500 environmental problems at the local, state, and regional level
indicated that information from both the natural and social science realms is
necessary for issue diagnosis and problem characterization.
P1-4. Osvaldo F. MORERA (Survey Research Laboratory, Univ. of Illinois at
Chicago)
A psychometric assessment of the divide and conquer principle in multiattribute
decision making.
The principle of "divide and conquer" (DAC) suggests that decomposing
multiattribute decisions enhances decision quality relative to holistic decision
making (Ravinder & Kleinmuntz, 1991; Fischer 1977; Ravinder, 1992). Other
evidence suggests that this generalization is dependent upon the choice of the
criterion variable (Cornelius & Lyness, 1980; Lyness & Cornelius, 1982). A new
comprehensive experimental framework designed to test the validity of the DAC
principle was developed. Results from recent study using the SMARTS procedure
(Edwards & Barron, 1994) indicate that the generality of the DAC principle is
indeed dependent upon the choice of the criterion variable.
P1-5. Holly ARROW (Dept. of Psychology, Univ. of Oregon), & Jonathan A. RHOADES
(Dept. of Psychology, New York Univ.)
Face-to-face and computer-mediated decision-making in established groups. This
study examines the role of membership change and communication medium in group
decision-making. Thirty established groups completed a hidden profile task
either face to face or via computer. Each group had a "guest" member visiting
from another established group. First, members individually reviewed materials
on 20 job applicants, took notes, and decided which candidates fit their
assigned criterion best. Next, the group discussed the candidates and made
final recommendations. Results indicate that guests showed performance
deficits similar to those observed for gender tokens (Lord & Saenz, 1985).
Information processing strategies differed across communication media, but
performance quality did not.
P1-12. David J. WEISS (California State Univ., Los Angeles), & Anthony D. ONG
(Univ. of Southern California)
The truth is in there.
In estimating the frequencies of behaviors not carried out in public view,
researchers accept the accuracy of respondents' reports. We explored two
factors expected to influence the decision to reveal, anonymity vs.
confidentiality and framing the question so that a behavior is reputedly
commonplace or rare. A key feature was the inclusion in our survey of a
socially disapproved behavior (cheating) for which we had validational
information. The privacy variable had an enormous impact; of those who had
cheated, 25% acknowledged having done so under confidentiality, but 74% admitted
the behavior under anonymity. Question framing had no effect.
P1-13. Lyn M. VAN SWOL (Univ. of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)
The effects of task type, interaction type, and expertise on acceptance of
advice.
Study examines effects of task type (intellective[math]/judgmental[movie
review]), advisor expertise (high/low), and interaction (face-to-
face/through writing) on a decision-maker's (DM) acceptance of an advisor's
advice. Advisor's confidence was highly correlated with DM's acceptance of
advice, and DM's matched advisor's advice significantly more when the
advisor had high expertise, especially for the intellective task. When
interacting face-to-face, participants had higher group identity, and DM's had
more trust and confidence in advisors and thought advisors were more honest
and competent. DM's had a significantly harder time understanding advice when
it was given through writing by a low-expertise advisor.
P1-14. Russell S. COOPER, & Susan LEVENE (Dept. of Psychology and Family Studies, United States International Univ.) Cultural effects on confidence and information search in decision-making. Past research demonstrated that consensus (or lack thereof) among information sources affects the information search process (Cooper and Sniezek, 1995) such that less information is sought and confidence is higher. The current study considers the effect of the cultural variable of individualism/collectivism (Hofstede, 1980). The prediction is one of an interaction between consensus and individualism and collectivism. Specifically, the normative influence of consensus will have greater effect on people who adhere to collectivistic values. The study was a quasi-experimental design with consensus manipulated and individualism/collectivism assessed for each participant. Results and implications are discussed.
P1-15. Seth HAMMER (Dept. of Accounting, Coll. of Business and Economics,
Towson Univ.)
Ambiguity and safe harbors: Determining whether to claim a home office
deduction.
An experiment was conducted which found that under high ambiguity tax reporting
conditions, tax professionals perceive that clients would be decreasingly likely
to claim a home office deduction as dollar levels of the expense increased, even
where the expenditures are believed to have met the Internal Revenue Service's
"realistic possibility of success" standard, which precludes the imposition of
penalties against either taxpayers or preparers. The study provides findings
consistent with Howard Raiffa's argument (1961) that under conditions of high
ambiguity, decision making is based largely on individual temperament.
P1-16. Matthew H. OLSON, & Emily STARK (Dept. of Psychology, Hamline Univ.) Personality factors and decision making. 80 undergraduate students completed the NEO-PI personality assessment, and scores on traits of neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness and conscientiousness were recorded. Two weeks later, all participants indicated their answers to decision scenarios involving risk aversion, risk seeking, likelihood estimation, susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy, and belief in "good luck." Results indicated that personality factors, particularly extraversion-introversion, may help to account for some but not all variability commonly observed in judgment and decision data.
P1-17. Michael SIEPMANN, Jonathan BARON, Karen STEINBERG, & John SABINI (Univ.
of Pennsylvania)
Individual differences in attitudes toward one's own wishful thinking.
Subjects judged the probabilities of eight desirable and eight undesirable
statements about their future, and then indicated the probabilities they would
have assigned if they thought the way they would ideally like to think. They
also provided reasons for discrepancies between initial and ideal probabilities,
and indicated how strongly they wanted each statement to be true or false.
Some subjects consistently felt they would ideally think more optimistically;
some more pessimistically. We explored correlations with psychological
well-being, and distinctions among subjects' ideals of accuracy, effective goal
achievement, and psychological well-being.
P1-18. Karen STEINBERG (Univ. of Pennsylvania) Regret-proneness and decision style: Evidence for individual differences. These studies examined whether people's degree of regret over their decisions and difficulty making them varies dispositionally, not just situationally. Subjects completed the Decision-Style Questionnaire (DSQ)--a measure that operationalizes regret-proneness and decision style through questions about hypothetical decision scenarios--and answered DSQ-based questions about actual decisions to take a particular course and to attend a particular college. Regret-proneness and decision style were consistent over a 1-month period and across the assessed domains, suggesting that they may constitute a stable individual difference.
P1-19. David A. WASHBURN (Center of Excellence for Res. on Training, Morris
Brown Coll., and Dept. of Psychology, Georgia State Univ.), Harold H. GREENE
(Center of Excellence for Res. on Training, Morris Brown Coll.), & R. Thompson
PUTNEY (Center of Excellence for Res. on Training, Morris Brown Coll., and Dept.
of Psychology, Georgia State Univ.)
Individual differences in attention and shoot/don't-shoot judgment skills.
Students were tested with a battery of 18 tasks to determine individual
differences across basic dimensions of attention, and on a series of
shoot/don't-shoot scenarios in a firearms training simulator. The sensitivity
of threat detection (d') was reliably predicted by measures of scanning (RSVP
and visual search), decision time, and dual-task disruption. Response bias was
significantly predicted by workload measures and the continuous performance
task. Each regression model accounted for over half of the respective variance.
Thus, accurate shoot/don't-shoot judgments were reliably associated with rapid
scanning of visual attention, fast mental speed, and sustained attention.
P1-20. Rebecca J. WHITE, Nancy E. BRIGGS, & Ching-Fan SHEU (DePaul Univ.) Gender effect in judging self-performance. This study investigates how individuals evaluate their performance as well as that of others in a group. Participants individually worked on three crossword puzzles in a room with seven other people. The groups varied in gender composition. The puzzles varied in film categories. This task is chosen in contrast to previous research on self-evaluation of academic performance. Participants estimated how many items they completed, as well as the average number the group completed. Preliminary results show participants over-estimated their performance, males more so than females. We found no effect for gender on group composition or task content.
P1-21. Gwen GRAMS, Robert TRACY, Ching-Fan SHEU, & Fred HEILIZER (DePaul
Univ.)
Self deception in perception of personal appearance.
This study examines three hypotheses: (1) that people create favorable self
deceptions or illusions given motive and opportunity; (2) that this tendency is
associated with healthy psychological functioning; and (3) that deception will
decrease when the level of perceptive distortion required by the task exceeds a
noticeable difference. To test these suppositions, each experimental
participant was asked to rate a series of photographs that included an original,
unaltered photo of the participant with six other photos that were altered to be
either more or less attractive than the original. Results showed participants
disproportionately rated both the altered and the unaltered photos as "less
attractive" than themselves; and these differences were associated with higher
self esteem and depression scores. Further, participants tended to give
unaltered ("real self") photos higher attractiveness ratings (relative to the
altered photos), than did independent observers. Yet, many participants
attenuated use of this practice when the altered images were highly distorted.
P1-22. Janet A. SCHWARTZ (Dept. of Psychology, Rutgers Univ.), & William P.
NEEDHAM (Dept. of Psychology, Purchase Coll., SUNY)
Hypothetico-deductive reasoning and formal operations: A reinvestigation of
Wason's THOG task.
Recent research has suggested that performance on concrete versions of Wason's
abstract classic THOG task might be mediated by cognitive development, as well
as contextual presentation. The purpose of this study was to reinvestigate
Wason's question with the classic THOG task and ask whether
hypothetico-deductive reasoning ability is related to formal operations.
Seventy-two undergraduates completed the classic THOG task, the Executioner
problem (Needham & Amado, 1995), and six formal reasoning tasks. A significant
correlation between formal operations score and performance on the THOG tasks
was found, indicating that performance on the THOG task is mediated by both
contextual presentation and cognitive development.
P1-23. Marcelle A. SIEGEL (Graduate Group in Science and Mathematics
Education, Univ. of California at Berkeley)
Teaching high school students with Convince Me software: Decision as scientific
theory building.
High school students in an issue-oriented science class (SEPUP) learned to make
decisions using Convince Me (CM) software. CM possesses a connectionist model
of explanatory coherence theory. Students entered "hypotheses" and
"evidence" and linked these with positive or negative weights. CM assisted
students in constructing a scientific argument while providing them with
simulation-based feedback about the coherence of their decision. CM students
significantly distinguished between hypotheses and evidence. They improved the
structure of their arguments after receiving feedback from CM. Student work was
also compared with a SEPUP control class which did not use CM.
P1-24. Julie GOLDBERG (Dept. of Psychology, Univ. of California, Berkeley), &
Baruch FISCHHOFF (Dept. of Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon Univ.)
Perceived and experienced risks and benefits of potentially addictive
activities.
Young people face an array of potentially addictive activities. Their decisions
regarding these activities may depend on their judgments of the
probabilities and magnitudes of possible positive and negative consequences.
This study examined whether misperceptions about the experience of addiction
influence the decision to use drugs. Survey results indicate that
underestimation of both the risk of addiction and the pleasure of using drugs is
related to problematic drug-use. Similarly, beliefs about the consequences of
engaging in potentially addictive activities were related to judgments
about actual drug-use. These findings provide insight into the potential
positive and negative effects of informational interventions.
P1-25. Christine M. CAFFRAY, & Sandra L. SCHNEIDER (Dept. of Psychology, Univ.
of South Florida)
Enhancing positive and reducing negative affective states as motivators in
adolescent risky behaviors.
Adolescents decide to participate in many risky behaviors that may have
life-altering consequences. Adolescents' outcome expectations about the desired
states that may be achieved or avoided by engaging in risky behaviors
represent important precursors to these decisions. We found that a group of
adolescents who chronically engaged in risky behaviors held stronger beliefs
that the reduction of several negative affective states (e.g., depression,
boredom) and the enhancement of positive affective states (e.g., good time)
motivated their participation in risky behaviors. In contrast, the group who
were less inclined to participate in risky behaviors were more focused on the
negative consequences of those behaviors.
P1-26. Janis E. JACOBS (Pennsylvania State Univ.) Developmental changes in the use of base rates and heuristics. Earlier studies with children have shown that the use of the representativeness heuristic increases across middle childhood (e.g., Davidson, 1995; Jacobs & Potenza, 1991). The current study extended that work by manipulating the base rate ratios to determine the conditions under which children would use quantitative versus heuristic information. In a sample of 200 subjects of ages 4, 6, and 8, we found that judgments of the youngest children were not significantly affected by changes in ratio or instruction, but that those of the older children were significantly affected by both, so that they gave the most accurate judgments when they looked at disparate ratios and heard the base rate instructions.
P1-27. Ambrocio Mojardin HERALDEZ, Charles J. BRAINERD, & Valerie F. REYNA
(Univ. of Arizona)
Children's spontaneous false memories.
Six-, nine-, and twelve-year-olds listened to a series of sentences and
received immediate, one-week, and one-month delayed recognition tests. Test
items included targets and three types of distractors with different degrees of
semantic relationship to targets. Prior memory tests both preserved
true memories (hits) and created false memories (false alarms) on later tests.
False memories were more persistent over time than true memories. All effects
increased with age. These results are interpreted in terms of fuzzy-trace
theory's analysis of judgement processes in children eyewitness testimony.
P1-28. Lilian M. STEIN, & Valerie F. REYNA (Univ. of Arizona)
False memories and judgments in a juror-type situation: Fuzzy-trace theory
analysis.
Theorists have made contradictory predictions about effects of repetition on
memory for narratives. These contradictions are explained by fuzzy-trace
theory. To test this explanation, a juror-type situation was created where
participants were presented with either one, two or eight witnesses' versions of
the same event. Two events were presented, counterbalancing order. As
predicted, contradictory effects of repetition were obtained on recognition
tests for decisions about verbatim statements versus implications made either
consistently or inconsistently by different witnesses about the same event.
Applications of fuzzy-trace theory to false memories and judgment processes will
be discussed.
P1-29. Ronald L. WOODARD, & Valerie F. REYNA (Informatics and Decision Making
Lab., Univ. of Arizona)
Memory-reasoning independence in covariation judgment: A fuzzy-trace theory
analysis.
This study investigates the relation between memory and reasoning using a
covariation estimation task of alpha-numeric stimuli, followed by a memory probe
for the input information. Stimulus pairs are of targets and distractors that
are consistent, ambiguous, or inconsistent with regard to the overall relation
of the stimuli. Memory performance was such that the proportion of
affirmative responses was greater for consistent pairs than for inconsistent
pairs across targets and distractors (reconstruction from gist), and greater for
targets than for distractors across consistent and inconsistent pairs (verbatim
memory for the input information), supporting predictions of Fuzzy Trace Theory.
P1-30. Michael R. P. DOUGHERTY (Univ. of Oklahoma), Rickey P. THOMAS (Kansas State Univ.), Charles F. GETTYS, & Eve E. OGDEN (Univ. of Oklahoma) The conjunction error as a memory retrieval phenomenon. This research examined MINERVA-DM's account of the conjunction error. Participants were trained on the frequency of various traits in a population of fictitious animals. The probability of each trait characteristic was determined a priori. Participants rated the probability of each trait individually, e.g., P(A), P(B), and the conjunctions, e.g., p(A&B). Experiment 1 found that people commit the conjunction error when judgments are based on memory. Participants in experiment 2 made either frequency estimates (frequency format) or probability estimates (probability format). The frequency format decreased, but did not eliminate, the number of errors made, even when participants reported using their memory. Results of both experiments support MINERVA-DM.
P1-31. H. David SMITH (Middlebury Coll.), Mark F. STASSON (Virginia
Commonwealth Univ.), & William G. HAWKES (Sch. of Medicine, Univ. of Maryland)
Diagnosticity and the dilution effect: Is more diagnostic information less prone
to dilution?
The addition of nondiagnostic to diagnostic information yields less extreme
judgments - a phenomenon known as the "dilution effect." The influence of
highly vs. moderately diagnostic information as a possible moderator of this
effect on judgments of student grade point averages (GPA) was investigated.
Judgments of fictitious student profiles were significantly affected by the type
of diagnostic information presented, and less extreme judgments of GPA were
noted when nondiagnostic information was included. Findings were consistent
with the dilution effect and generalized across both types of diagnostic
information.
P1-32. Noel E. WILKIN (Univ. of Mississippi), & Glenn J. BROWNE (Texas Tech
Univ.)
The influence of argument-based evidence on degree of belief.
Extending the theory that beliefs are constructed using arguments and judgments,
this research evaluates the influence of argument type on subjects' degrees of
belief. Subjects were presented with argument and/or information-based
assertions with the intent of manipulating degrees of belief. Assertion type,
order, and direction (for or against) were manipulated. Degrees of belief were
evaluated using likelihood and support measures. It is hypothesized that degree
of belief is (1) influenced more by causal arguments than authoritative
arguments; (2) influenced more by argument-based evidence than simple
information-based evidence; and (3) not affected by argument order and
direction.
P1-33. Daniel G. GOLDSTEIN, & Gerd GIGERENZER (Max Planck Institute for Psychological Research, Munich, Germany) Recognition: How to exploit your own lack of knowledge. The recognition principle is a fundamental heuristic for inference. This heuristic advises considering only recognized alternatives when choosing among several. From this principle is deduced a counter-intuitive state of affairs wherein certain incomplete knowledge states allow one to make better inferences than more complete knowledge states. The conditions necessary for this less-is-more effect are stated. Through experiment and computer simulation, a less-is-more effect in a real-world environment is demonstrated.
P1-34. Laura MARTIGNON, Gerd GIGERENZER (Max Planck Institute for Psychological
Research, Munich), & Kathryn LASKEY (Dept. of Systems Engineering, George Mason
Univ.)
Evaluating fast and frugal choice heuristics.
Fast and frugal heuristics are evaluated against subtle and mighty Laplacean
Demons. The question concerning the real nature of Laplacean Demons is debated
(the metaphor used by Gigerenzer and Goldstein is a slightly modified version of
Laplace's omniscient creature: she does not have all information but operates
optimally on the available information). Multiple Regression is only one of the
candidates Demon may use. What characterizes Demon is the flexibility to use
one or the other strategy according to each environment. Good candidates in
Demon's toolkit are well specified Bayesian Networks and Classification Trees.
But if an analysis of computational costs is performed by Demon, she may well
end up choosing a simple and more frugal algorithm like Take The Best, whose
accuracy does not fall too far behind that of mightier algorithms.
P1-35. Michael SCHMITT (Institute for Theoretical Computer Science, Technische
Universitaet Graz, Austria), & Laura MARTIGNON (Max Planck Institute for
Psychological Research, Munich)
Improving the performance of satisficing cognitive algorithms.
We investigate a family of cognitive algorithms that has been proposed recently
by Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) to model a kind of human behavior - known as
one-reason decision making - in the task of comparing two objects as to which
scores higher on a given criterion based on binary cue information. How should
the cues be ranked in order to achieve the largest number of correct
decisions? We provide a theoretical framework for studying this question by
analyzing the approximation capabilities of satisficing cognitive algorithms.
We introduce an algorithm that has not been considered before and show that it
can be used to improve the performance of any cue-based algorithm in many cases.
We also exhibit a relation between the comparison task and a class of problems
that is studied in the area of machine learning.
P1-36. Ryan O. MURPHY (Dept. of Psychology, Western Washington Univ.) Stability of calibration biases over time. Recent research in judgment and decision making (Yates, 1989) indicates that there are significant cross-national differences in levels of miscalibration biases (suboptimal resolution and overconfidence). However, investigations of miscalibration biases are based on an implicit assumption that has yet to be empirically validated. The researchers assumed that individuals have a relatively stable level of judgment biases on the same task over time. Ongoing research indicates that this previous assumption is valid. The distribution of miscalibration biases are also reported.
P1-37. Todd R. DAVIES (Koc Univ., Istanbul) Effects of available time on confidence following choice. Previous experiments indicated that subjects' generic confidence is reduced by the "half-range method" of probability assessment, which forces the subject to make a binary choice between propositions prior to expressing a probability. Further experiments by Davies (1995) indicated that this effect can be eliminated (and possibly reversed) when subjects reflect sufficiently on the binary choice and gain insight through this process. New studies in Turkey and the U.S. show that manipulating the time available for assessment is sufficient to induce reduction in confidence following choice. With enough time, the effect of choice on confidence depends systematically on propositional content.
P1-38. Jack SOLL (INSEAD, France), Joshua KLAYMAN (Graduate Sch. of Business,
Univ. of Chicago), Claudia GONZALEZ-VALLEJO (Ohio Univ.), & Sema BARLAS (Direct
Marketing Technology)
An unbiased test of the hard/easy effect.
The hard/easy effect is a well-known yet disputed result in probability
judgment tasks: People are overconfident for hard items and underconfident for
easy ones. Several authors have illustrated how the traditional method of
dividing questions by difficulty leads to artifactual results. Random
sampling methods are also problematic. We employ a "split-sample" technique
that provides an unbiased test. The hard/easy effect disappears when comparing
domains, but reappears when comparing people. Participants who are less
accurate or more overconfident on one sample of questions tend to be more
overconfident on another sample. We discuss several possible explanations.
P1-39. Gregory L. BRAKE, Michael E. DOHERTY (Dept. of Psychology, Bowling Green State Univ.), & Gernot D. KLEITER (Univ. of Salzburg) A lens model approach to calibration. The calibration task used in the present studies was designed with Brunswik's strictures concerning representative design in mind, and conceptualized within a Lens Model framework as well as a calibration framework. Twenty subjects who were knowledgeable about baseball predicted winners of rich but incomplete descriptions of 150 randomly sampled baseball games, making half-scale probability judgments that the predicted teams would win. In a replication, 20 additional subjects were run, ten making half-scale judgments and ten full-scale judgments. In both experiments, substantial underconfidence was found in the great majority of subjects. The relationship between calibration accuracy measures and the Lens Model indices is explored.
P1-40. Paul C. PRICE (Dept. of Psychology, California State Univ., Fresno) Wishful thinking about sporting event outcomes is reduced by a relative-frequency elicitation question. College sports fans judged the likelihood that one team would beat another in various football and basketball games. Some answered a probability question: "What is the probability that Team A will beat Team B?" Others answered a relative-frequency question: "Out of 100 games like this one in all important respects, how many times would Team A beat Team B?" The positive correlation between the judged likelihood that Team A would win and the stated desire that Team A would win (wishful thinking) was reduced or eliminated in the relative-frequency condition.
P1-41. Alan SANFEY, & Reid HASTIE (Univ. of Colorado at Boulder) Judgment of events: Are we influenced by frequency or probability? Many everyday judgments and decisions are based on an evaluation of previously acquired information. This study examined the influence of both frequency and probability of event occurrence on judgments of event likelihood. Participants saw a series of election poll results for various candidates. Each candidate's frequency of winning was varied independently of the their probability of winning, enabling a determination of whether win frequency or win probability influenced subjects' predictions of the winner of the election. Experiment 1 used a new context to replicate Estes' (1976) finding. Experiment 2 addressed some methodological limits of experiment 1.
P1-42. Peter JUSLIN, & Henrik OLSSON (Dept. of Psychology, Uppsala Univ.,
Sweden)
Personal probability spaces: The principle of insufficient reason revisited.
The theory of Personal Probability Spaces provides a psychological
implementation of the principle of insufficient reason and proposes that when
people are faced with a probability judgment task cognitive processing is framed
in terms of an initial subjective probability space elicited by the context and
the situation. The probabilities initially assigned within the PPS are
soon "swamped" by the outcome of cognitive processing, but the inertia of the
initial probability space will continue to influence the beliefs. PPS-theory
predicts a learning trajectory with initial conservatism, then overconfidence,
and finally calibration. The model further accounts for sub-additivity of
implicit disjunctions and illusory correlations.
P1-43. Pia WENNERHOLM, & Peter JUSLIN (Dept. of Psychology, Uppsala Univ.,
Sweden)
Base-rate inverse and base-rate neglect in categorization: A test of the
elimination hypothesis.
A new explanation of the base-rate inverse effect (Medin & Edelson, 1988) and
base-rate neglect (Gluck & Bower, 1988) in the categorization literature is
tested. This explanation rests on two assumptions: (1) At the early stages of
learning, a high-level reasoning process referred to as elimination operates,
leading to base-rate inverse, (2) After further training, with more trials than
in previous experiments, participants change into exemplar-based processing
and learn to appreciate base rates. Two experiments, which partly replicate the
studies by Medin and Edelson (1988) and Gluck and Bower (1988) reveal a pattern
consistent with the elimination hypothesis.
P1-44. Ralph HERTWIG (Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin,
Germany), Peter SEDLMEIER (Univ. of Paderborn, Germany), & Gerd GIGERENZER (Max
Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany)
Judgments of letter frequencies: Are they systematically biased due to
availability?
How do humans estimate whether a particular letter is more frequent in the first
versus in a later position in written words? We tested four hypotheses, two of
them precise versions of the "availability heuristic," a third that assumes that
frequency processing occurs on the level of the phonological classes of vowels
and consonants, and a fourth--the regressed-frequencies hypothesis--that assumes
an (imperfect) monitoring of individual letters. The results are closest to the
predictions of the regressed-frequencies hypothesis. They are inconsistent with
Tversky and Kahneman's (1973) conclusion that judgments of letter frequencies
are systematically biased due to availability.
Poster Session #2
(Sunday, November 23, 5:30 - 7:00 pm)
P2-1. Tiffany BARNETT (Fuqua Sch. of Business, Duke Univ.) Making tough decisions that count: The moderating role of trust on information processing in complex decision making. In this study, we investigate the impact of trust on consumers' information processing and search behavior in high stakes, complex decisions. The study addresses the following questions: Does having a trustworthy service provider to share decision making responsibilities with significantly impact the amount and depth of processing in which consumers engage (i.e., are consumers more likely to rely on heuristics)? If so, is the importance of trust more or less meaningful as decisions become less complex? Lastly, how does the impact of established trust in a service relationship differ when there is no trust or an active element of distrust.
P2-2. Marlene MORRIS (Fuqua Sch. of Business, Duke Univ.)
Effects of product innovation and decision-related emotion on consumer decision
avoidance.
The focus of the present research is on the effects of affective influences
(decision-related emotion, attitudes) and product innovativeness on consumer
decision making and likelihood of decision avoidance. Two proposed
contributions of this research are, first, an examination of the construct of
product innovativeness, identifying two distinct categories: newness of the
product and degree of continuous innovation. A second contribution will be an
examination of the effects of decision-related emotion on conflict and decision
avoidance. Possible interactions between product innovativeness and
decision-related emotion are predicted and will be examined.
P2-3. Sue O'CURRY (Dept. of Marketing, DePaul Univ.), & Ching-Fan SHEU (Dept.
of Psychology, DePaul Univ.)
Reference price formation: Which variables matter?
We report the results of several studies designed to explore reference price
formation. Using an experimental approach derived from psychophysics, we
presented subjects with price sequences varying in regularity, proportion of
time on discount, depth of discount, shape of sequence, and presence or absence
of brand name. We elicited reference prices and ranges of normal price. The
data indicate that depth of price cut has a significant impact on estimates of
price. In addition, branding leads to higher estimates of the least upper bound
of the price range, pointing to a significant role for non-price information in
reference price formation.
P2-4. Carla C. CHANDLER, Leilani A. GREENING, & Leslie ROBISON (Dept. of
Psychology, Washington State Univ.)
How base rates frame personal risk judgments.
When women judge their risk of getting osteoporosis, their estimates tend to be
much lower than the stated base rate (50%) because they believe that they have a
better-than-average family history. In contrast, risk judgments tend to match
the stated values if the base rates are contingent on family history (e.g., the
risk is 55% for those who have a family history of osteoporosis and 45% for
those who do not). While contingent base rates provide a frame that constrains
risk judgments, they do not make women more worried about osteoporosis and thus
may not influence personal decisions.
P2-5. Judith L. REESE, Sandra L. SCHNEIDER, Theresa E. HNATH-CHISOLM, & Harvey
B. ABRAMS (Univ. of South Florida)
Message framing and intervention approach to encourage hearing aid use.
Hearing aid use can reduce the handicapping effects of hearing loss and improve
quality-of-life in older, hearing impaired individuals; yet, hearing aids are
underutilized by this group. A counseling intervention to persuade them to use
hearing aids was assessed. Both message frame (i.e., negative, positive or
minimal) and intervention approach (i.e., prescribed treatment or
optional service) were manipulated. Results suggest that the negatively framed
message with either approach was especially influential in getting participants
to keep their hearing aids, as was the prescribed treatment approach
when combined with a minimal message. The positively framed message was
generally ineffective.
P2-6. Celia E. WILLS (Coll. of Nursing, Michigan State Univ.), & Colleen F. MOORE (Dept. of Psychology, Univ. of Wisconsin-Madison) Judgments of likelihood and confidence for antidepressant medication acceptance. Students (N=89) rated likelihood and confidence for accepting an antidepressant medication based on efficacy and risk of nausea information presented in hypothetical consent-for-treatment forms. Ratings were made for four different formats of nausea base rate risk information for positive and negative frames. A framing effect occurred for likelihood ratings for positive versus negative frames. Students who made ratings for only one frame were more likely to have zero variability in likelihood and confidence ratings than students who made ratings for both frames. Likelihood and confidence ratings were correlated positively. Implications for health risk communications and informed consent will be described.
P2-7. Kristina G. GORBATENKO-ROTH (Dept. of Psychology, Univ. of
Wisconsin-Stout), & Irwin P. LEVIN (Dept. of Psychology, Univ. of Iowa)
Capturing patients' judgment policies in weighting different domains of quality
of life.
The goal was to determine how individual differences in weighting the following
domains of quality of life account for overall differences in patients'
evaluation of medical outcomes: physical functioning, emotional functioning, and
role (job) functioning. "Policy capturing" methodology was used in which
medical patients rated their anticipated satisfaction with each of a series of
hypothetical scenarios defined by varying levels of functioning on each of the
three domains. Regression analysis showed that a model which incorporated
individual differences in domain weighting significantly outperformed a model
which placed equal weight on each of the three domains of quality of life.
P2-8. Mandeep K. DHAMI, & Peter AYTON (Dept. of Psychology, City Univ.,
London)
A policy capturing study of magistrates' bail decision making.
The policy capturing method developed in social judgement theory was used to
examine magistrates' bail decisions. A sample of magistrates made bail
decisions upon hypothetical cases and then ranked the cues according to their
relative importance in making their decisions. Policy capturing research has
consistently found that: (a) linear models can quite accurately represent the
judge; (b) judges utilise a small number of cues; (c) judges are inconsistent;
(d) there are inter-individual differences in policies; and (e) judges lack
insight into their policies. The results of this study are discussed in
relation to these findings. The practical implications are also discussed.
P2-9. Patrik N. JUSLIN (Dept. of Psychology, Uppsala Univ., Sweden) Judgment analysis of emotional communication in music performance. Music performers are able to communicate specific emotions to listeners. The performers use a number of cues in the performance to generate the emotional expression, and listeners employ the same cues in their judgments of the expression. However, to improve the communicative process it is necessary to relate encoding to decoding aspects. In this study, multiple regression was applied to the relationships between (a) the performer's intention and the cues, and (b) the listener's judgment and the cues. The two systems were related using the Lens Model Equation. The results show how performers can become better at communicating emotions to listeners.
P2-10. Ellen PETERS (Univ. of Oregon), & Paul SLOVIC (Univ. of Oregon and
Decision Research)
Impact of emotional information in complex decisions.
Emotional information is predicted to loom larger in complex than simple
decisions, particularly for individuals who tend to be high in emotional
processing. Subjects are presented with simple and complex pairs of options.
One option - the emotional option - is preferred for noninstrumental, emotional
reasons while the other option - the analytical option - is preferred for
instrumental reasons. Complex decisions include additional attribute
information. Emotional information weighed more heavily in complex decisions -
the emotional option was chosen more often in complex than simple decisions.
Individuals high (as compared to low) in tendency towards emotional processing
showed this effect more strongly.
P2-11. Lisa J. ABENDROTH (Fuqua Sch. of Business, Duke Univ.)
Regrettably so: The effects of justification, action, and outcome knowledge on
regret.
This research examines how reasoning during the decision process interacts with
action/inaction and outcome knowledge to influence regret. The first experiment
found that action/inaction distinctions had no effect on the justifiability of
reasons and that the valence of an outcome affected bad reasons only. Results
of the two main experiments indicated that good reasoning provides insulation
against regret only when the more favorable, alternative outcome is unknown. In
addition to replicating the commission bias when no reasons were provided,
results from the third experiment revealed that perceived effort may mediate the
effect action has on regret.
P2-12. Monica D. BARNES, & Sandra L. SCHNEIDER (Dept. of Psychology, Univ. of
South Florida)
The relationship between omission and status quo biases and affective reactions
to lottery outcomes.
218 subjects participated in a lottery where they had the opportunity to win or
lose a small prize. Prior to the lottery, participants could either move (act)
or stay (fail to act) and either switch their endowed status quo prize (change
status quo) or keep it (maintain status quo). Using a questionnaire,
participants' affective reactions were assessed both immediately and one week
after the lottery. No effects were found for regret, but there was an omission
bias for satisfaction. Results are discussed in comparison to previous
anticipatory scenario studies of regret and satisfaction.
P2-13. Léonie E. M. GERRITSEN, & Gideon B. KEREN (Eindhoven Univ. of
Technology, The Netherlands)
How does information about choice options influence regret and disappointment?
In a series of experiments, we examined how pre- and postdecisional information
influences the intensity of experienced regret and disappointment. Results show
that predecisional information, a manipulation of whether a negative outcome was
foreseeable or not, only influenced the intensity of regret. Postdecisional
probabilistic information, given a negative outcome, influenced the intensity of
both regret and disappointment, although in opposite ways. Results will be
discussed in the context of regret and disappointment theories.
P2-14. Gal ZAUBERMAN, & Dan ARIELY (Fuqua Sch. of Business, Duke Univ.) The moderating role of evaluation goals on sequential effects: The relationship between hedonic and informational evaluation. This work examines the effects of the evaluation goals (Hedonic and Informational) on the final retrospective evaluation of experiences. Specifically, we examine different characteristics of the experience's pattern and their role in impacting its overall evaluation under these two goals. The pattern parameters used are, Initial information, Peak intensity, Final information, and Rate of change. Different intensity patterns were used in order to estimate the effect of these parameters. The results indicate that evaluations under the two modalities are different with respect to the parameters noted above. In other words, the evaluation mode systematically impacts the way information over time is integrated.
P2-15. Carla M. KMETT (Univ. of Dayton), Hal R. ARKES (Ohio Univ.), & Steven K.
JONES (Air Force Academy)
The influence of two decision aids on high school students' satisfaction with
their college choice.
Recent research suggests that examining the bases of one's decisions can lower
subsequent satisfaction with the outcome of those decisions. We predicted the
contrary result in a field study using high school students' college choice.
Some students used no decision aid, some used a pro/con list, and some used a
computer program in making their actual college choice. The two aids resulted
in significantly higher outcome satisfaction when assessed after one college
term. However this result was found only among those students whose initial
bases for their decision were less accessible on a subsequent memory test.
P2-16. Laura HUTZEL, & Hal R. ARKES (Dept. of Psychology, Ohio Univ.) Regret may be a fuel for inaction inertia. Some participants reported their propensity to buy shoes for $90 after missing an initial opportunity to buy them for either $80 or $40. Other participants reported the amount of regret they felt over missing the initial opportunity. The availability of the initial opportunity varied by three locations: Columbus, Ohio; St. Louis; or Southeast Asia. When the missed deal was great and available, regret was high and propensity to buy was low. When the missed deal was not so great and/or not available, regret was low and the propensity to buy was high. We hypothesize that regret fuels inaction inertia.
P2-17. Hal R. ARKES, & Laura HUTZEL (Dept. of Psychology, Ohio Univ.) The role of probability of success estimates in the sunk cost effect. Arkes and Blumer (1985) demonstrated that those who want to continue investing in a failing course of action inflate its estimated probability of success [p(s)]. Participants rated a project's p(s) either before or after making an investment decision. The latter group manifested a significantly higher p(s) than the former, suggesting that inflating the p(s) retroactively "rationalizes" the prior investment decision rather than mediates the investment decision. Also, compared to participants who didn't want to invest, those who did thought that such an investment would be significantly more influential in promoting the project's success.
P2-18. Elmer Anita THAMES (John Carroll Univ.) The effect of mental accounting, endowment, and sex on the sunk-cost effect. This study examined how sunk-cost effects vary with mental accounting, endowment, and sex. Subjects' decision to reinvest, decision confidence, annoyance at paying the reinvestment cost, and disappointment at missing the investment event were assessed. There were significant effects for sunk-cost and mental-accounting manipulations as well as an interaction between them. Decision makers' sex also produced significant effects. Endowment manipulations did not reach significance.
P2-19. Bennett CHERRY, Lisa ORD ÑEZ, & Stephen GILLILAND (Dept. of Management
and Policy, Univ. of Arizona)
Grade expectations: The effects of expectations on fairness and satisfaction.
Subjects judged the satisfaction and fairness of grades in either a
hypothetical, laboratory context or in an actual classroom situation.
Expectations of grades were manipulated in the lab study and measured in the
field study. The results indicate that, contrary to Equity Theory, grades
exceeding expectations were judged to be equally fair as grades meeting
expectations. However, lower than expected grades were judged to be unfair.
Satisfaction judgments for the same stimuli showed loss aversion.
P2-20. Lisa ORDOÑEZ, Terry CONNOLLY, & Richard COUGHLAN (Dept. of Management
and Policy, Univ. of Arizona)
Multiple reference points in pay satisfaction assessments.
MBA students judged the satisfaction and fairness of salary offers given to a
hypothetical MBA graduate. Subjects were presented with information about
offers received by one or two other graduates with similar backgrounds as well
as the offer to the focal graduate. Both satisfaction and fairness ratings were
consistent with subjects comparing the offer with other offers one at a time and
then combining the feelings associated with these comparisons.
P2-21. Michael E. WALKER (Ohio State Univ.), & Osvaldo F. MORERA (Univ. of
Illinois, Chicago)
Disparate WTA/WTP disparities? The influence of human vs. natural causes.
Contrary to predictions of economic theory, evidence suggests the value
associated with willingness to accept compensation (WTA) for a product far
exceeds the value to pay (WTP) for that object (Knetsch and Sinden, 1984). In
the context of compensation for damage, cause of damage (human versus
naturally-occurring) influences estimates for both WTA (Ritov and Baron, 1990)
and WTP (Kahneman, Ritov, Jacowitz, and Grant, 1993). In this study, subjects
provided WTA and WTP judgments in scenarios where cause of damage was either
human or natural. Results suggest interactions between type of value judgment
and context may influence WTA/WTP disparities.
P2-22. David V. BUDESCU, Kristine M. KUHN, Karen KRAMER, James HERSHEY, &
Adrian RANTILLA (Dept. of Psychology, Univ. of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)
Tradeoffs in risk attributes: The joint effects of dimension preference and
vagueness.
Previous research has demonstrated that people are generally averse to
imprecisely specified (vague) probabilities and/or outcomes. The current
research investigated the joint effects of vagueness in both dimensions.
Subjects provided Certainty Equivalents for vague and precise positive gambles
over a wide range of probabilities and outcomes. Imprecise probabilities and
outcomes were equated in terms of their effects on the gambles' expected values,
providing a meaningful metric for comparison. We found slight vagueness
avoidance for probabilities and quite strong preference for vague outcomes. A
general model of decision making with vaguely specified attributes that captures
this pattern is proposed.
P2-23. Kristine M. KUHN, & David V. BUDESCU (Dept. of Psychology, Univ. of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)
Reversal of preferences for vagueness in risky decision making.
This study demonstrates response mode effects in expressed preferences for
vagueness. We analyzed individual and group data from two studies where
subjects evaluated hypothetical risks, of equal expected loss, by using direct
choice and ratings of individual options. We found (1) a greater tendency to
express indifference via ratings, and (2) stronger vagueness avoidance in
ratings than choice. Choice depends primarily on the mean values of the two
dimensions, whereas ratings are also affected by the relative precision of the
probabilities and outcomes. This suggests that the precision with which
attributes are specified functions as a secondary (less prominent) dimension.
P2-24. Mary E. HUNEKE, Wendy S. FORBES, Irwin P. LEVIN (Univ. of Iowa), & J. D.
JASPER (Univ. of Toronto)
Comparing decision processes in set formation and final choice.
Process tracing measures were derived from an information search and monitoring
task in which some subjects were asked to form a set of options for later
consideration; others made only a final choice; and others used a "phased
narrowing" task in which they first formed a consideration set and then made a
final choice from this set. The following issues were addressed: 1) Processing
differences between set formation and choice; 2) Inclusion vs. exclusion
processes in set formation; and 3) Trade-offs in effort devoted to set formation
and final choice.
P2-25. Melissa L. FINUCANE (Decision Research), Murray T. MAYBERY, & Dan MILECH
(Univ. of Western Australia)
Behavioral decision theories: Competing or complementary?
Typically, decision researchers adopt a priori one model of individuals'
decision strategies, and fit data to the model. Consequently, over-fitting of
the data is common and the relative explanatory power of alternative models is
ignored. Two studies are reported, demonstrating a technique for directly
comparing strategies from two traditionally competing explanations of
decision making: information integration theory and simplification theory. The
findings showed that different strategies from the two theories are used
reliably, and that the type of decision problem influences strategy selection.
Rather than competing, the theories complement each other in explaining how
individuals make decisions for a range of decision problems.
P2-26. Murray T. MAYBERY (Univ. of Western Australia), Melissa L. FINUCANE
(Decision Research), & Dan MILECH (Univ. of Western Australia)
On the importance of value trees in the evaluation process: Do superstructure
and detail matter?
Value trees generated using multiattribute utility technology are useful in
assessing conflict over the importance of different pieces of decision
information. Previous research on the effects of tree construction confounded
the manipulation of superstructure and detail with changing the surface
structure context in which attributes were weighted. In the present study,
relative importance weights were elicited from 64 participants for attributes
organised in trees that differed in superstructure and detail, but held constant
the surface structure context. The results indicated that weights were
influenced greatly by attribute detail, but only to a limited extent by changes
in superstructure.
P2-27. Linda R. ELLIOTT (Armstrong Laboratories), John R. HOLLENBECK (Michigan State Univ.), & Philip T. DUNWOODY (Univ. of Georgia) Conflicting information in simultaneous and sequential displays: Patterns of decision error in a multiple-cue threat assessment task. Complex information is increasingly represented using visual displays configured to enhance perception, comprehension, and decision making. In this study, we expected to distinguish patterns of decision error based on existence of conflicting information and simultaneous versus sequential display of information. We predicted that a sequential display of information would be more likely to result in primacy error, consistent with Anchoring and Adjustment theory. In contrast, decision making in a simultaneous display condition was predicated to be characterized by an averaging heuristic, reflecting a tendency to process information more holistically (Hammond et al. 1987). Results supported hypotheses as predicted.
P2-28. Robert P. MAHAN, Philip T. DUNWOODY (Univ. of Georgia), & Linda R.
ELLIOTT (Crew Technology, Armstrong Labs)
Effects of representation fidelity on judgment simulation performance: More is
different.
In training simulation research, the more fidelity achievable, the better the
simulation is assumed to depict the task. However, altering a simulation
representation may fundamentally alter task properties, as well as the responses
to the task. This study demonstrated that a threat assessment simulation
presented in a low fidelity numeric format versus a higher fidelity graphical
format produced two distinct performance profiles. Here, the Numeric format
supported highest performance under low complexity conditions, while, the
graphical version supported highest performance under higher complexity
conditions. The outcomes appear related to the organizing principles activated
by the different formats. The results suggest that performance measures geared
to specific organizing principles induced by format should be considered
integral to any simulation development program.
P2-29. Robert M. ROE (Purdue Univ.), Stephen E. EDGELL, & William P. NEACE
(Univ. of Louisville)
Sequential versus simultaneous presentation of information in a probabilistic,
decision-making-like environment.
Three studies explored the effect of presenting two information dimensions
simultaneously or sequentially in a probabilistic, decision-making-like
environment. With varying presentation order, the utilization of a single
relevant dimension was less with sequential presentation. However, with a
constant order of presentation this effect occurred only when the irrelevant
dimension was presented first. If the pattern and one dimension were relevant,
the effect was small for utilization of the dimension, but larger for
utilization of the pattern.
P2-30. Eric. R. STONE, & Carolyn J. RUSH (Wake Forest Univ.)
Risk communication: The effectiveness of graphical modes depends on the risk
magnitude.
Previous research we have conducted comparing graphical presentational formats
to numerical formats found that, for low-probability risk magnitudes, graphical
formats induced greater professed risk-avoidant behavior than did numerical
formats. In two studies, the present research found that this effect did not
generalize to situations with higher risk magnitudes. These results suggest
that framing effects found in the risk communication literature may be dependent
on the risk level employed, and in particular may be most common with
low-probability scenarios, perhaps due to people's unfamiliarity with such low
probabilities.
P2-31. Stuart M. SENTER, & Douglas H. WEDELL (Dept. of Psychology, Univ. of
South Carolina)
Information presentation constraints and judgment accuracy.
Participants judged the attractiveness of apartments under constraints which
forced them to view information either by alternative or by dimension. Results
from previous research on choice under presentation constraints has shown that
dimensionwise constraints result in more accurate choices and less effort
expenditure than alternativewise constraints. It was found that the
dimensionwise constraint resulted in more accurate judgments within a choice
set, while the alternativewise constraint resulted in more accurate judgments
between sets. Results are discussed in relation to process tracing
methodologies and the findings of previous research utilizing presentation
constraints.
P2-32. Jonathan C. PETTIBONE, & Douglas H. WEDELL (Dept. of Psychology, Univ.
of South Carolina)
Contextual sensitivity of ideal point preferences.
Contextual sensitivity of ideal point preferences has been established for
psychophysical stimuli (Riskey, Parducci, & Beauchamp, 1979) such as sweetness
of a beverage but not for social judgments such as attractiveness. In three
experiments, we explore this issue using computer generated faces that varied in
nose width and eye gap. In Experiment 1, participants made descriptive and
attractiveness judgments of faces that varied on one feature. In Experiment 2,
both features were manipulated together. In Experiment 3, participants chose
which of three faces was most attractive. Results from all three
experiments support the contextual sensitivity of ideals for attractiveness.
P2-33. Winston R. SIECK (Univ. of Michigan) Range and frequency effects on probability judgment. Two experiments examined the effects of the range and relative-frequency of objective probabilities (OP) in the stimulus set on subjective probabilities (SP). Experiment 1 stimulus sets had either relatively more or fewer mid-range than extreme OPs (i.e., hard vs. easy environments). Experiment 2 stimulus sets consisted of either a narrow or wide range of OPs corresponding to hard and easy environments. The hard-easy effect was essentially replicated. Results were consistent with range-frequency theory which suggests that the hard-easy effect reflects a tendency to assign the same number of presented OPs to each of the SP categories available.
P2-34. Bridget C. FLANNERY, Stacey A. NEFF, Jeremy D. JOKINEN, & Bruce W.
CARLSON (Ohio Univ.)
Judgmental forecasting when changes occur in a time series.
In this study, we investigated how people respond to changes in the direction of
a time series when making forecasts. We found that people produce forecasts
that are too close to the most recent value of a time series, a result that is
consistent with previous research and that has been described as an anchoring
effect. We also found that this conservatism decreases as people gain
experience with a time series. Finally, we found little evidence that the time
to make a forecast is related to changes in a time series. The implications of
these results are discussed.
P2-35. Ayse ONCULER (Dept. of Operations & Information Management, Wharton
Sch., Univ. of Pennsylvania)
Modeling intertemporal choice under uncertainty.
The purpose of this experimental study is to examine if future uncertainty is
treated differently than immediate uncertainty and future certainty. The
findings suggest risk preferences depend on the time period over which the
outcomes are evaluated. Specifically, risk aversion decreases with respect to
future gains and increases with respect to future losses. Based on the
experimental observations, an intertemporal choice model is constructed to study
the change in the behavior due to future uncertainty.
P2-36. Dilip SOMAN (College of Business, Univ. of Colorado at Boulder) Virtual progress: The importance of being on the move vs. getting there. We examine service situations in which the start and end times are constant but the path characteristics are manipulated. Subjects indicated a preference for services with lower idle duration, in which idling occurs in the middle of the interval rather than at the beginning, and in which there is physical movement towards the goal for a large part of the interval. Thus, subjects choose alternatives in which they experience a sense of progress even though the actual goal might be reached at the same time. We refer to this as virtual progress. We show that virtual progress influences choice prior to the service experience but not the satisfaction when evaluated after the service. Further, virtual progress influences preferences in situations where the individual personally experiences the passage of time due to salience.
P2-37. Scott HIGHHOUSE (Bowling Green State Univ.), Susan MOHAMMED
(Pennsylvania State Univ.), & Jody R. HOFFMAN (Bowling Green State Univ.)
Temporal discounting of strategic issues: Bold forecasts for opportunities and
threats.
Asymmetrical discounting of strategic issues was found such that students (N =
86) discounted distant threats more than distant opportunities. In addition,
even though immediate threats were viewed just as likely to occur as immediate
opportunities, distant threats were seen as less plausible than distant
opportunities. Experiment 2 (N = 222) found that a manipulation of a threat's
likelihood of occurring had no effect on the temporal discounting of the
hypothetical threat. However, the perceived control of threats increased as
temporal distance increased. We conclude that perceived control plays an
important role in the reduced plausibility of distant threats.
P2-38. Michael J. ZICKAR, & Scott HIGHHOUSE (Bowling Green State Univ.) Examining framing effects using item response theory. Item response theory (IRT) models were estimated for four risky-choice problems, answered by students under either a gain or loss frame. IRT methodology allowed an in-depth examination of several issues that would be difficult to explore using traditional methodology. Results support the typical framing finding of risk-aversion for gains and risk-seeking for losses. However, results suggest that individual differences in preference-for-risk are more influential in predicting risky choice than framing condition. Also, these results suggested that the Asian Disease problem, most often used in framing research, has anomalous statistical properties when compared to other framing problems.
P2-39. Laurie ZIEGLER (Univ. of Texas at Dallas)
Risk preferences in strategic decision making: Influences of decision
importance.
Research supporting prospect theory's predictions concerning the effects of
gain/loss framing on risk preferences has focused on very important
decisions. However, it has not systematically examined the effects of decision
importance on risk preferences. The joint effects of gain/loss orientation and
decision importance on managerial risk preferences in strategic decision
making are examined. Experimental results indicate that decision importance
moderates gain/loss framing effects. Subjects' choices were risk seeking for
low importance decisions framed as gains. Consequences of this study for
understanding how decision importance affects risk preferences are considered.
P2-40. Timothy R. JOHNSON (Dept. of Psychology, Univ. of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign)
On the (nonlinear) multivariate analysis and representation of subjective
probability judgments.
One common form of data in judgment and decision making research is a n by m
array of subjective probability judgments made by n judges regarding m events.
This study demonstrates the application of multivariate analytical
and representation methods to these arrays based on nonlinear principal
components and biplot displays. In the application and interpretation of these
methods, the distinction is made between half- and full-range judgments as
well as between confidence and forecasting judgment data. The distinction is
also made between absolute and ordinal level judgment data. The proposed
methodology is extensively demonstrated with an empirical data set.
P2-41. Robert B. BRANSTROM (Dept. of Psychology, Univ. of California,
Berkeley)
Choice response times and an interactive activation network model of
multiattribute choice.
ultiattribute decision models typically assume that utilities derived from
attribute values are based on fixed utility functions. Alternatively, an
interactive activation network model assumes attribute nodes receive initial
activations related to attribute values, but activations then change dynamically
as the network "settles into" a solution. In a two alternative, two attribute
choice task, this model, like utility based models, correctly predicts decisions
for compensatory and dominated choices. However, the network model predicts a
pattern of decision response times not predicted by conventional multiattribute
models. Empirical results support the network model's predicted pattern
of response times.
P2-42. Kenneth RONA (Fuqua Sch. of Business, Duke Univ.)
Growing decision rules.
This paper presents a computer simulation that "grows" decision rules according
to evolutionary principles. Decision rules are made up of elementary
information processes with initial rules being randomly generated. A large
number of rules are constructed, presented with a risky choice problem, and then
evaluated based on their performance on some set of goals. Rules are then
selected from the population based on their performance and combined with each
other to create new decision rules to be represented in the next generation.
Rules that are more fit will emerge over time, thereby identifying the most fit
type of rules in a given decision environment.
P2-43. Marcus O'CONNOR (Univ. of New South Wales, Australia) The asymmetry of judgemental confidence intervals in time series forecasting. This study examines the prevalence and determinants of the symmetry of judgemental confidence intervals around the forecast in time series forecasting. Most prior research on judgemental confidence intervals has assumed that the intervals are symmetrically placed around the forecast. However, this study shows that people are extremely disposed towards estimating asymmetric confidence intervals and that many of these intervals are grossly asymmetric. Results indicate that the placement of the forecast in relation to the last actual value is a major determinant of the direction and size of the asymmetry.
University of Chicago
The University of Chicago Graduate School of Business is seeking to hire tenure track faculty with interests in the areas of decision making, negotiations, and organizations, all broadly defined. We will consider both new Ph.D.s and more experienced candidates with excellent records. We are looking for candidates with strong disciplinary training in any of the social sciences who can use that disciplinary background to conduct research on aspects of behavior relevant to management in organizations and to introduce MBA students to behavioral science principles. This position is part of the Managerial and Organizational Behavior area, whose members are responsible for teaching courses such as Managing in Organizations, Managerial Decision Making, Power and Politics, and Negotiations. Candidates should be qualified to teach at least one of these courses plus another MBA elective. The group has a well-equipped laboratory for experimental research. Applications should include a vita, one research paper authored by the candidate, and two or three letters of reference. Please have all the materials sent to: Professor Joshua Klayman, M.O.B. Recruiting, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, 1101 E. 58th St., Chicago, IL 60637. To guarantee full consideration, all materials must be received by December 1, 1997. The University of Chicago is an equal-opportunity/affirmative-action employer.
University of Oklahoma
Cognitive psychologist. The Department of Psychology at the University of Oklahoma seeks applications for an entry-level, tenure-track position in cognitive psychology. Successful applicants will be expected to maintain an active research program, secure extramural funds, direct doctoral students, and participate in undergraduate education. Applications from women and minorities are especially welcome. Applicants who specialize in any area of cognitive psychology will be considered, although preference may be given to those with a research record in decision-making or applied cognitive (especially cognition and technology) who can form bridges to areas already represented on the faculty (i.e., language, knowledge, memory). The successful applicant also will be expected to teach the cognitive survey course at the undergraduate and graduate level. The Department consists of 16 faculty in experimental/ quantitative psychology and 30 doctoral students. Human research laboratories include a 5000 sq. ft. state-of-the-art, networked data-collection and conference facility. The University offers competitive salaries and excellent fringe benefits. OU is in Norman, a college-town located 20 minutes from Oklahoma City (a metropolitan area of 1,000,000). Screening will begin January 15th and continue until the position is filled. Candidates must send a letter of intent, vita, reprints/preprints, evidence of teaching ability, and three letters of recommendation to: Scott Gronlund (sgronlund@ou.edu), Cognitive Search Committee, Department of Psychology, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK 73019-0535. Phone (405) 325-4553; Fax (405) 325-4737; <http://www.ou.edu/cas/psychology/>. The University of Oklahoma is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Employer.
Loyola University Chicago
The Department of Psychology at Loyola University Chicago has an opening for a
tenure-track assistant professor to start in the Fall of 1998, in the area of
social psychology. The appointee will be expected to develop an active research
program and contribute to both the undergraduate and graduate teaching needs of
the department. Teaching responsibilities will include a graduate course
in social cognition. We are looking for persons with evidence of substantial
research productivity/promise, a conferred doctorate, and strong teaching
skills. All qualified applicants will be considered, but those with expertise
in social judgment, stereotyping, intergroup relations, etc., would best serve
our needs. Also, due to the applied emphasis of the program, applicants with
some applied interests will be preferred. Applicants should send a vita,
statement of teaching and research interests, evidence of teaching
experience/ability if available, representative reprints/preprints, and
three letters of recommendation on or before January 15, 1998 to: Chair, Social
Search Committee, Department of Psychology, Loyola University Chicago, 6525 N.
Sheridan Rd., Chicago, IL 60626.
Members of underrepresented groups are strongly encouraged to apply. Loyola is
an Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Action Employer.
University of Wisconsin - Madison
The Department of Industrial Engineering, University of Wisconsin-Madison, is seeking candidates for two tenure-track faculty positions beginning in 1998. Candidates at all ranks are encouraged to apply. Candidates should have demonstrated skills in teaching excellence and in initiating and managing an active research program. The area of specialization is open; of particular interest are candidates who conduct interdisciplinary research on applications of information integration, analysis, and utilization. Current faculty with interests in information engineering have research specialities in decision sciences, health systems, human factors, manufacturing, operations research, and quality. Minority and female candidates are especially encouraged to apply. For further information about the department, please visit our web site at: <http://www.engr.wisc.edu/ie/>. Please direct applications to: Faculty Recruitment Group, Department of Industrial Engineering, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1513 University Avenue, Room 360, Madison, WI 53706-1572. To ensure consideration, applications should be received by December 15, 1997. The search will continue until positions are filled.
University of California, San Diego
The Department of Cognitive Science at the University of California, San Diego invites applications for a faculty position at the assistant professor level (tenure-track) starting July 1, 1998, the salary commensurate with the experience of the successful applicant and based on the UC pay scale, and subject to the availability of funds. Applicants are sought in the area of higher cognitive function and must have a PhD (or ABD). A broad interdisciplinary perspective and experience with multiple methodologies will be highly valued. Postdoctoral experience is desirable. Women and minorities are encouraged to apply. The University of California, San Diego is an affirmative action/equal opportunity employer. All applications received by January 1, 1998 will receive thorough consideration until position is filled. Candidates should include a vita, reprints, a short letter describing their background and interests, and names and addresses of at least three references to: University of California, San Diego, Faculty Search Committee, Department of Cognitive Science 0515-JE, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093-0515.
Princeton University
Princeton University's Department of Psychology and Woodrow Wilson School of
Public and International Affairs (WWS) are planning a joint venture in
psychology and public policy. At least one joint appointment between the
Psychology Department and the WWS is anticipated at the junior level, with some
post-Ph.D. experience expected. Applicants must have an active research program
in social or cognitive psychology and a commitment to teaching and advising
in the Psychology Department at both the graduate and undergraduate levels. In
addition, applicants should be comfortable interacting with neighboring social
science disciplines (such as economics and politics), have an interest in policy
applications, and be ready to teach psychology/policy courses at the WWS.
Applicants should submit a curriculum vitae and three letters of reference. All
materials should be submitted by December 1, 1997 to: Search Committee PWS,
Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Green Hall, Princeton, N.J.
08544-1010.
Princeton University is an equal opportunity/affirmative action employer.
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
The Department of Philosophy, Psychology and Cognitive Science at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute seeks a colleague to help shape the department's emerging focus in applied cognitive science. Rank is tenure-track at the assistant or associate level. Competitive candidates will possess exceptionally promising potential for applied research and the ability to attract research funding. The successful candidate will be expected to contribute significantly to our interdisciplinary, technology-based programs that train tomorrow's leaders in the design and use of cognitive systems that interface between human and machine cognition. Of special interest to members of the J/DM Society is our new "Minds and Machines" program. See our website for more information: <http://www.rpi.edu/~brings/DEPT/mm.html>. Rensselaer is a private, non-sectarian, nationally ranked university with 350 faculty, serving approximately 4,000 undergraduates and 2,000 graduate students. Founded in 1824, Rensselaer is the oldest technological university in the country and is the recipient of many national awards for its excellence and initiative in the design of collaborative classrooms and interactive learning. Rensselaer is located in Troy, New York, one of three cities comprising New York's Capital District. Troy is located on the historic Hudson River within easy driving distance of New York City, Boston, Montreal, as well as the Adirondack, Berkshire, and Catskill mountains. Screening of candidates will begin immediately and continue until the position is filled. Applications from qualified minority candidates and women are especially invited. Applications materials should include a cover letter, c.v., selected reprints, and three letters of recommendation and be directed to: David B. Boles, Chair, Cognitive Science Search Committee, Department of Philosophy, Psychology, and Cognitive Science, 305 Carnegie Building, 110 8th Street, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York, 12180-3590, Fax: (518) 276 - 8268.
Duke University
The Fuqua School of Business has tenure-track openings in the Decision Sciences area at the rank of Assistant Professor and/or untenured Associate Professor. Candidates should have the potential and inclination to develop a strong research program, with interest in both theory and application, and to teach effectively at the MBA, Ph.D., and Executive Education levels. A doctoral degree is required. Duke University is an affirmative action/equal opportunity employer and actively solicits applications from qualified minority candidates. Interested individuals should send a current resume, a vision statement describing research and teaching interests, copies of representative publications or working papers, and names of at least three references by December 31, 1997, to: Professor Robert Nau, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Box 90120, Durham, NC 27708-0120. For more information about the Decision Sciences area at the Fuqua School of Business, please visit our web site at <www.fuqua.duke.edu>.
The rapid progress of information technology has had tremendous impact on organizations. Data which required substantial efforts to acquire a decade ago is now at the fingertips of managers. Sophisticated analyses and forecasting packages allow executives to examine multiple perspectives on decision problems instantaneously. Interactive digital technology, in the form of the Internet and corporate intranets give individuals at all levels of organizations access to vast amounts of information. Volumes of email alone can bombard and overload individuals almost anywhere in organizations.
How do these developments affect managerial cognition and decision making? What is the role of managerial cognition in the filtering, interpretation, and sharing of such vast amounts of data? How can firms turn this data into knowledge? On the one hand the old predictions about replacing decision makers by machines and formulae are more feasible today than ever before. On the other hand, there are qualitative differences between "artificial intelligence" and managerial reasoning, interpretation, and decision making processes. Managerial cognition takes a central role in how organizations transfer data and information into knowledge and how such knowledge can be used for organizational innovation and change.
The purpose of this conference is to provide a forum where different research perspectives on managerial cognition can be presented and discussed. Papers can focus on any of the following broadly defined topics: (1) managerial risk taking and decision making, (2) the relation of managerial cognition to knowledge transfer, (3) managerial cognition, entrepreneurship and innovation, and (4) innovative theoretical or methodological approaches for advancing research in this area. Abstracts of no less than 750 words and no more than 1250 words must be submitted by November 30, 1997.
Criteria for selection will include relevance of the topic to the conference, the quality of the proposal and the ability to stimulate audience discussion and participation. Each of the presenters will be given sufficient time to present and discuss their papers. All of the papers presented at the conference will be considered for subsequent publication in a special issue of a leading journal or in an edited book of readings. Authors of accepted proposals will have to submit completed papers by March 15, 1998.
The title of the abstracts must show complete address, e-mail address, telephone and facsimile numbers for all authors. It should indicate who will present the paper if accepted. Three copies of the proposal should be submitted to one of the conference co-chairs: Theresa Lant or Zur Shapira, Department of Management, Stern School of Business, New York University, 44 West 4th St., New York, NY 10012-1126. Further information about the conference may be obtained from Theresa Lant (tlant@stern.nyu.edu, 212-998-0226) or Zur Shapira (zshapira@stern.nyu.edu, 212-998-0225).
DECISION-MAKING IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
Conference sponsored by the Economic Beliefs and Behaviour
research programme of the Economic and Social Research Council
University College Oxford 1-2 July 1998
This conference will review our understanding of economic decision-making and will be of interest primarily to economists, psychologists and sociologists working in this field. It will provide an opportunity for academics and others to discuss current research on the influence of perceptions of risk and uncertainty on choice behaviour, on the contribution of game theory and other methodological approaches, on the relevance of academic work to public policy developments involving markets and quasi-markets and on the part played by social values, cultural factors and group identity.
Keynote Speakers:
Professor George F. Loewenstein
Department of Social and Decision Sciences
Carnegie Mellon University
Professor Bruno S. Frey
Institute of Empirical Economic Research
University of Zurich
Conference committee:
Professor Michael Bacharach, University of Oxford
Professor John Hey, University of York
Dr Alan Lewis, University of Bath
Professor Peter Taylor-Gooby, University of Kent
Professor George Wright, Universities of Leeds and Strathclyde
Conference streams:
Risk and Uncertainty in Choice,
introduced by Professor Graham Loomes.
Applications of Game Theory,
introduced by Professor Michael Bacharach.
The Economic Psychology of Market Choice,
introduced by Dr Alan Lewis.
Choice and Public Policy,
introduced by Professor Peter Taylor-Gooby
There will also be an open stream.
Proposals for Papers
Proposals should be a maximum of 300 words in length and should be submitted to Ms Patricia Smith, Economic Beliefs and Behaviour programme, Darwin College, University of Kent, Canterbury, CT2 7NY, UK (email ebb-research@ukc.ac.uk; fax: +1227-824014) by Friday 6 February 1998.
Conference Bookings
The conference fee (to include full board during the conference) will be o150 for those booking before April 1998, o200 thereafter. Booking forms and further details are available from Ms Patricia Smith whose address is given above.
J/DM NEWSLETTER
Department of Information & Decision Sciences
Carlson School of Management
University of Minnesota
271 19th Avenue S.
Minneapolis, MN 55455