Research employing the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) has frequently shown that learning is impaired in various clinical populations. However, precisely what constitutes “unimpaired” control group learning remains unclear. In order to understand some of the possible factors underlying variability in control group {IGT} performance, the present study sought to manipulate features of the task to intentionally disrupt learning. Specifically, the present study investigated the effects of time constraints on emotion-based learning during automated administration of the IGT. For two groups of participants, a time-constraint of either 2-s or 4-s was implemented during the critical decision making period, while a control group received no time constraint. We also evaluated participants' subjective experience after every block of 20 trials. Results demonstrated that the 2-s group differed significantly from the control group. Subjective experience measures revealed rapid development of awareness of the advantageous and disadvantageous decks among all three groups. Overall, our findings demonstrate, for the first time, the effects of decision-phase time constraints on emotion-based learning and indicate that the {IGT} reward/punishment schedules are to some extent cognitively penetrable.
Keywords: Emotion-based learning
Keywords: Alpha model; Ambiguity; Expected utility; Mixture models; Rank dependent expected utility; Smooth model; D81; C91; C23
This paper estimates the determinants of decision time for different types of decision maker in the context of an experimental investigation of multiple prior models of behaviour under ambiguity. Four models are considered: Expected Utility, Smooth, Rank Dependent Expected Utility and Alpha model. The results of a mixture model which assigns subjects to types enable us to distinguish the factors influencing the decision time of each of these four types. We find that the different types are influenced by different factors. In general, the Rank Dependent type takes more time, followed by the Smooth, the Expected Utility and finally the Alpha type, whose decision time is always the lowest. Our results reflect the relative complexity of the preference functionals used by the different types. Consequently, the importance of looking at the process of pairwise choices rather than simply at the choice made is raised to the attention of theorists and analysts.
Keywords: decision time; choice under uncertainty; censored regression
Research on time pressure (TP) in negotiation has considered strategic choice (demands and concession making) but largely ignored information processing. Based on Lay Epistemic Theory (Kruglanski, 1989) it is hypothesized that {TP} reduces motivation to process information systematically, and the time needed to negotiate an agreement, and that it produces greater reliance on cognitive heuristics when placing demands, and less integrative agreements. Two studies revealed that effects of time constraint on information processing in negotiation were due to higher need for cognitive closure under high TP. Study 1 also showed that negotiators use stereotypes about the opponent as a heuristic cue more under high rather than low TP. Study 2 revealed that negotiators under high {TP} were less likely to revise their unfounded fixed-pie perceptions during negotiation and, therefore, reached less integrative agreements. Implications for motivated information processing in negotiation are discussed.
Keywords: Experiment; Experimental software
Keywords: Perceived quality; Price/quality heuristics; Satisfaction; Service delays; Signaling; Social influence; Waits
This paper discusses aspects of recruiting subjects for economic laboratory experiments, and shows how the Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments can help. The software package provides experimenters with a free, convenient, and very powerful tool to organize their experiments and sessions.
We study the effects of time pressure on risky decisions for pure gain prospects, pure loss prospects, and mixed prospects involving both gains and losses. In two experiments we find that time pressure has no effect on risk attitudes for gains, but increases risk aversion for losses. For mixed prospects, subjects become simultaneously more loss averse and more gain seeking under time pressure, depending on the framing of the prospects. The results suggest the importance of aspiration levels, and thus the overall probability to break even, under time pressure. We discuss the implications of our findings for decision-making situations that involve time pressure. This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.
Many decisions in economics and finance have to be made under severe time pressure. Furthermore, payoffs frequently depend on the speed of decision-making, as, for instance, when buying and selling stocks. In this paper, we examine the influence of time pressure and time-dependent incentive schemes on the quality of decision-making in an experimental beauty-contest game. We find that convergence to equilibrium is faster and payoffs are higher under low time pressure than under high time pressure. Interestingly, time-dependent payoffs under high time pressure lead to significantly quicker decision-making without reducing the quality of decisions.
Keywords: Quality of decision-making; Time pressure; Incentives; Beauty-contest experiment
Abstract This article examines a silver lining of standing in line: Consumers infer that products are more valuable when others are behind them. Specifically, the value of a product increases as more people line up behind a person (Study 1) and when others are present (versus absent) behind a person in line (Study 2). Value increases further when directing consumers' attention to the presence of others behind them?that is, when they look backward versus forward (Study 3) and when the queue structure emphasizes the last person to join rather than the person being served (Study 4). This effect of people in line behind them is associated with increased expenditures by queuing consumers (Study 5).
A queueing model--together with a cost structure--is presented, which envisages the imposition of tolls on newly arriving customers. It is shown that frequently this is a strategy which might lead to the attainment of social optimality.
We study batch queueing systems with continuous time, finite commuter populations, single server, and endogenously determined arrival times. Symmetric equilibrium solutions in mixed strategies are constructed and subsequently tested in two experiments that examine two different batch queueing models, one with a fixed server capacity, and the other with a variable server capacity. With experience in playing the stage queueing game repeatedly, experimental results from groups of 20 subjects support equilibrium play on the aggregate level when the server capacity is fixed and commonly known. When it is known to be variable, randomly changing from round to round, subjects diverge from equilibrium play and increase their individual payoffs substantially by significantly shortening their waiting time.
Keywords: Batch queueing; Game theory; Constant and variable capacity; Experiments
We study a class of queueing problems with endogenous arrival times formulated as non-cooperative n-person games in normal form. With multiple equilibria in pure strategies, these queueing games give rise to problems of tacit coordination. We first describe a Markov chain algorithm used to compute the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium solution, and then report the results of an experimental study of a large-scale (n=20) queueing game with fixed service time, FIFO queue discipline, and no early arrivals. Our results show consistent and replicable patterns of arrival that provide strong support for mixed-strategy equilibrium play on the aggregate but not individual level.
Keywords: Queueing; Endogenous arrival times; Mixed-strategy equilibrium; Experimentation
Keywords: batch queueing; equilibrium solution; experiment; coordination
We study the decisions agents make in two queueing games with endogenously determined arrivals and batch service. In both games, agents are asked to independently decide when to join a queue, or they may simply choose not to join it at all. The symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium of two games in discrete time where balking is prohibited and where it is allowed are tested experimentally in a study that varies the game type (balking vs. no balking) and information structure (private vs. public information). With repeated iterations of the stage game, all four experimental conditions result in aggregate, but not individual, behavior approaching mixed-strategy equilibrium play. Individual behavior can be accounted for by relatively simple heuristics.
Keywords: Batch queueing; Equilibrium solution; Experimental economics
We examine the influence of time pressure on bargaining behavior in an ultimatum game. Controlling for offers, rejection rates of responders are significantly higher under a tight than under a very weak time constraint. However, this effect vanishes with repetition.
Keywords: Time pressure; Bargaining; Ultimatum game; Experiment
The current research examines the effects of time pressure on decision behavior based on a prospect theory framework. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants estimated certainty equivalents for binary gains-only bets in the presence or absence of time pressure. In Experiment 3, participants assessed comparable bets that were framed as losses. Data were modeled to establish psychological mechanisms underlying decision behavior. In Experiments 1 and 2, time pressure led to increased risk attractiveness, but no significant differences emerged in either probability discriminability or outcome utility. In Experiment 3, time pressure reduced probability discriminability, which was coupled with severe risk-seeking behavior for both conditions in the domain of losses. No significant effects of control over outcomes were observed. Results provide qualified support for theories that suggest increased risk-seeking for gains under time pressure.
Keywords: Decision making; Prospect theory; Time pressure; Probability; Choice; Gambling
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